Golden Dome is next phase in long history of unsuccessful U.S. missile defense initiatives

Allison P. | Red Phoenix international correspondent–

It is early morning as a Space Force technician sips his still warm coffee – he checks the date – 2 March, 2043. A blip on the computer screen as SBIRS detect a launch. Curious as there was not an expected test today. Then another blip, and another, and another, then dozens, hundreds, thousands of detections. It is a day everyone had feared since the launch of sputnik – nuclear hellfire and the end of the world. But from that fear was born preparation, the work of the past 76 years culminating in the Golden Dome. From this, we would survive the apocalypse! The call goes out and defenses are activated. Counterbattery missiles launch flying towards the thousands of incoming rockets, decoys, and chaff. The missiles strike the warheads breaking them apart and nullifying their threat. This would be proof that the trillions of dollars and lifetimes invested into this system was worth it. But some make it through — A few moments later, the northern and western most cities are bathed in nuclear fire, her fire spreading rapidly down the continent. In horror the technician realizes what has happened, the folly before him, before he too is incinerated.

W87 MK-21 MIRV Warheads. Each warhead is capable of operating independently and allows a single missile to hit multiple targets. (Wikimedia Commons)

For any people who were alive during the 1980s or have a strong interest in science fiction, this series of events might be quite familiar and reminiscent of a different system, The Strategic Defense Initiative. This newest incarnation, termed the Golden Dome, follows a long, fairly unsuccessful history of US Ballistic Missile defense. These attempts extend back to 1957 with the Nike-Zeus, shortly after the launch of Sputnik. The US has invested at this point around $320 billion USD* into missile defense at a recent annual burn of $10-13 billion USD, a number that is set to double in this next fiscal year. The US has successfully created a number of past systems capable of intercepting missiles, however a system the scale of what is being discussed is likely to be somewhere between 500 billion and several trillion USD — and even then may still only be effective against small “rogue state” strikes.

For many people the idea to create a defense grid over the US seems sensible, natural, and logical. It is a staple of science-fiction and for many people seems science-fact. The Golden Dome is clearly inspired by the Iron Dome, a complex system of networked RADARs, interceptor missiles, gun-based C-RAM systems, and LASERs, capable of intercepting incoming rockets, and it does quite effectively protect Israeli civilians and infrastructure against the meagre resistance of the people their state is actively genociding. If it works so well, why simply can we not make something large enough to defend across the whole continent?

The simple answer is speed. A sugar rocket launched by resistance fighters may be flying at 200m/s and a few kilometers of distance. To physically hit a two meter target the interceptor must fly on a trajectory within 3.44 arcminutes and reach that point within 10 thousandths of a second accuracy. To give an idea of the accuracy necessary, hold your arm out at length and stick up your thumb. Your thumb subtends roughly 2 degrees — 40 times wider than the angle this system must fly and in a window shorter than a single frame on a high end 180fps monitor. A scud missile travels at around 1500m/s during its reentry and a length around 12m. A THAAD defense system, designed to combat this sort of ordinance (RIM-161 has similar capabilities at sea), is capable of firing up  to a range of 200km, meaning the angle must be within 0.206 arcminutes at 8 thousandths of a second. An ICBM is however a very different story. These systems have to move as fast as spacecraft at 7500m/s. Additionally most systems carry multiple warheads which will be separated after the boost phase to target multiple locations – called MIRVs. The US Peacekeeper missile carried 10 W87 MK-21 warheads with a diameter of 0.56m and a length of 1.75m. The Ground-Based Interceptor is the core weapon able to engage ICBMs. For obvious reasons it is not readily available the range it would engage targets at, however we will use the same value as the THAAD, though it is likely to be higher. This would give a value of 0.03 arcminutes and a 0.2 thousandths of a second.

GMD Test Launch from Vandenberg Sept. 12, 2021. 40 of these systems are staged at Fort Greely Alaska with another four at Vandenberg California. (US Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency)

These values are extremely difficult to hit and do not include the closing speed of the missile. The Iron Dome is effective against the small rockets however it was not effective against even Iran’s attacks with SCUD like missiles. In a full nuclear strike it will not be one missile, but thousands, each carrying multiple warheads as well as decoys and radar chaff. Even if the missiles were 100% effective, which they are not, you would need tens of thousands of these missiles before even counting the complex radar and computing systems. This is why historically, systems have either focused to try to target systems early in flight (which is very difficult against ICBMs which tend to be set in a country’s interior) or through detonating nukes defensively over your own country in hopes the blast and radiation would damage or disrupt the incoming warhead without needing such great precision.

The Sprint Antiballistic Missile, shown here in a test launch, would have carried a nuclear warhead to disrupt terminal incoming warheads 3-9km above US cities. (Wikimedia Commons)

The simple matter is this system is likely to be incredibly expensive and ineffective, however its greatest danger lies in the belief the system is credible. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) has been the core of nuclear doctrine ever since the USSR detonated her first bomb and showed the ability to project that across the globe. The core idea is that if you launch your missiles at me, I will return back at you with a second strike, and we both are destroyed. What happens though if one can stop that second strike? It tips the balance in favour to launch that first strike. It is easy to become over-confident in that system and in your stars. Even today it is not terribly difficult to find people suggesting that the US should nuke China or Russia believing themselves already protected and safe. Currently the US has 44 of these interceptors. It is, right now, only a small segment of disconnected jingoists with this sentiment, but it is easy to become overconfident and err. One should ask is this system actually necessary, who does it serve, and could it be mankind’s greatest folly?


* $320 billion is an estimate from data to 2021 and holding additional $10B over four years to bring to an estimated present total.



Categories: Technology, U.S. Military, U.S. News